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n 16 May 2007, the European Commission 
issued a Proposal for a Council Directive 
providing for sanctions against employers 
of illegally staying third country nationals 
COM(2007) 249.
1 The measure aims at providing a 
harmonised EU framework for imposing sanctions 
on employers for hiring third country nationals 
(TCNs) who do not enjoy a regular status of stay in 
the EU. The proposal would establish a common 
policy consisting of three main features. First, 
employers would be subject to a number of new 
administrative obligations that would need to be 
fulfilled before recruiting any TCNs. Non-
compliance would lead to a series of punitive 
measures, financial sanctions and criminal penalties. 
Second, the procedure for operationalising 
complaints would be harmonised; and third, each 
member state would be required to inspect the 
employee records in 10% of its registered 
companies. 
What is the key argument supporting Community 
action in this area? The proposal states that a 
common deterrent is needed to discourage the 
phenomenon of irregular immigration.
2 The 
European Commission is of the opinion that 
employment is a key ‘pull factor’ attracting irregular 
immigration, and that the imposition of sanctions on 
employers would reduce the illegal employment of 
TCNs. Thus, the proposal raises a number of 
questions that need to be debated: What are the 
strengths and weaknesses in the rationale, scope and 
legal basis of the proposed legislation? What is the 
added value to the EU for a having a common 
European policy over this area? Are the grounds 
justifying Community action sufficiently robust? As 
we will argue, the proposal suffers from a number of 
vulnerabilities. Among others, we highlight the 
following:  
1. A partial personal scope. The use of irregularity 
of stay of the TCN as the sole connecting factor for 
the sanctions overlooks everyone else who may be a 
victim of labour exploitation.  
2. The predominance of the employment dimension. 
There is a very strong employment dimension 
embracing the content and aims of the initiative, 
which may call for the need to reconsider the 
treatment of this issue from an exclusive 
immigration control perspective. Are immigration 
rules an effective way to tackle the problem of 
exploitation in the workplace? 
3. An uncertain EU added value. The value added of 
applying criminal sanctions to employers needs to 
be tested against the EU principles of 
proportionality and effectiveness.  
This paper proceeds in four sections. The first 
section provides a short overview of the main 
contents of the proposal by looking at the 
obligations and sanctions applicable to the 
employer, the procedures foreseen for the 
presentation of complaints as well as the set of 
guarantees provided to the TCN worker. Section 
two assesses the rationale, personal scope and 
context of the measure. Section three analyses its 
added value and compatibility with some general 
principles of Community law. Finally, we offer 
some conclusions in the last section. 
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1 .  M a i n  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  p r o p o s a l :  
Prevention, criminalisation, complaint 
mechanisms & guarantees 
The proposed Directive plans to harmonise at 
European level a nexus between employment, 
immigration and criminal law. This section presents 
its key features. 
1.1 Obligations & sanctions 
The act would establish specific administrative 
burdens for employers seeking to employ TCNs. In 
particular, Art. 4 stipulates that the member states 
shall oblige employers to:  
1. ask the TCNs to present a valid residence permit 
or another similar document. This requirement 
would be fulfilled unless the documentation is 
manifestly incorrect (e.g. the photograph does not 
correspond to the holder or when the document has 
been clearly tampered with);  
2. copy or record the content of the residence 
permit;  
3. keep the copies or records available during the 
phase of employment in the event of inspection; and  
4. communicate to the relevant authorities the start 
date and termination of the labour relationship.  
In case of non-compliance with these obligations, 
the following financial sanctions, punitive measures 
and/or criminal offences would apply: 
1. Financial sanctions. The proposal calls the 
member states to ensure that the sanctions are 
“effective, proportionate and dissuasive”.
3 They 
would include fines linked to each of the TCNs 
employed irregularly as well as payments of the 
costs in the event that the worker involved is subject 
to return to the country of origin or transit. The 
exact amount of fine and/or penalty would be 
determined at the discretion of the relevant body in 
the member state involved. The employer would 
also have to pay the TCN’s back payments which 
would include any outstanding remuneration/wages, 
taxes and social security contributions.
4 
2. Other punitive measures
5. 
a) An employer could be excluded from entitlement 
to public benefits, aid or subsidies for up to five 
years;  
b) exclusion from participation in a public contract 
for up to five years;  
c) recovery of public benefits, aid or subsidies 
including EU funding managed by the member 
states that has been granted to the employer during 
the 12 months preceding the detection of irregular 
employment;
6 and  
d) temporary or permanent closure of the 
establishments that have been used to commit the 
infringement. 
3.Criminal offences. Art. 10 provides that illegal 
employment will constitute a criminal offence when 
committed intentionally and when there have been 
at least one of the following four types of serious 
cases:  
a)  repeated infringements consisting of a 
continuation of the irregular employment after 
the competent nationals authorities or courts 
have reached at least two findings against the 
employer regarding illegal employment within a 
period of two years; 
b)  significant number of illegally employed TCNs, 
when at least four are being employed; 
c)  particularly exploitative working conditions in 
comparison for instance with ‘legally employed 
workers’; and 
d)  knowledge by the employer that the worker is a 
victim of human trafficking.
7 
In order to ensure that individual employers are only 
held liable to criminal sanctions under these serious 
cases, the initiative stipulates that repeated 
infringement shall be criminalised where it is the 
third infringement within a two-year period. 
Furthermore, Art. 11.1 calls upon the member states 
to apply “effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
criminal sanctions” against those employers who 
have been found in breach.
8 
Where the employer is a legal person,
9 Art. 13 
foresees the applicability of criminal sanctions and 
other punitive measures, such as the exclusion from 
entitlement to public benefits or aid, exclusion from 
participation in public contracts up to five years, 
temporary or permanent disqualification from the 
practice of agricultural, industrial or commercial 
activities, placement under judicial supervision and 
a judicial winding-up order. The measure also 
provides sanctions in cases of sub-contracting (Art. 
9).
10  
Art. 15 requires member states to ensure that the 
employee records of at least 10% of the companies 
established on their territory are inspected. The 
selection of the companies subject to this sort of 
inspection would be based on risk assessments 
carried out by the competent national authorities, 
taking into account the sector of activity in question 
and any past record of infringement. 
1.2 Complaint mechanisms & guarantees 
Art. 14 of the proposal foresees: “The Member 
States shall provide mechanisms through which 
third-country nationals in illegal employment can  
Reflections on an EU Framework on Sanctions against Employers of Irregular Immigrants | 3 
lodge complaints against their employers, directly 
or through designated third parties.” The 
Explanatory Memorandum clarifies that third parties 
need to be protected when providing assistance to 
lodge complaints, against possible sanctions under 
rules prohibiting the facilitation of unauthorised 
residence.  
Art. 14.3 offers additional measures to protect TCNs 
in the case of particularly exploitative working 
conditions,
11 such as the possibility to grant a 
residence permit linked to the duration of the 
relevant national proceedings to the TCN who has 
lodged the application. In order to ensure 
effectiveness in relation to ‘back payments’ by the 
employer, Art. 7.2 provides that the latter will need 
to pay any outstanding remuneration, taxes and 
social security contributions. Member states will 
also have the possibility to enact a series of 
instruments guaranteeing that the claiming 
procedures are automatic, and that a work 
relationship of at least 6 months duration would be 
presumed. 
2. The rationale & scope: Weaknesses & 
vulnerabilities 
The proposal aims at harmonising the 
criminalisation of the employment of irregularly 
staying TCNs all across the EU.
12 According to the 
European Commission’s Impact Assessment 
accompanying the proposal,
13 the initiative aims at 
contributing to reduce irregular immigration, 
reducing employment of irregularly staying third-
country nationals; creating a level playing field for 
EU employers;
14 and facilitating the reduction of 
exploitation of irregularly staying third-country 
nationals.
15 
2.1 Irregularity of stay as the connecting 
factor 
One of the core objectives of the initiative is to deter 
irregular immigration by tackling undeclared work, 
which is denominated by the proposal as illegal 
employment. The latter is defined as the 
“employment of a third country national who is 
illegally staying on the territory of a Member State” 
(Art. 1.d). The irregular nature of stay of the non-
EU national constitutes the connecting mechanism 
for considering employment as illegal, and therefore 
for the Directive to become operational. The 
exclusive use of the linking factor of irregularity of 
residence confines the personal scope of the 
measure to a partial or sectoral approach, as it would 
not cover all categories of migrants, let alone 
migrant workers, who may also be subject to 
irregular employment independently of their 
administrative status of stay.  
A TCN may enjoy a legal status of stay and yet still 
perform work falling outside the national legal 
framework. S/he may also enjoy a regular status of 
residence but have no or limited rights of access to 
employment.
16 Further, the personal scope of the 
proposal does not cover nationals of those member 
states who have joined the EU in two latest rounds 
of enlargement and who are still subject to 
transitional arrangements, thereby limiting their free 
access to the labour markets of a number of the EU-
15 member states.
17 
In addition to the narrow personal scope, the 
irregularity of stay will be determined according to 
the respective national immigration legislation. The 
dominance of the national level in this context 
brings about a highly diverse picture.
18 There is at 
present no common definition of an irregular 
immigrant or what constitutes irregular immigration 
at EU level. Any Community action in this field 
must start from clear, precise and unconditional 
definitions of these terms in EU law that are not 
subject to the vagaries of national variations, 
administrative practices and discretion.
19  
As stated above, the proposal has been presented as 
forming part of the common EU immigration policy. 
Yet, when looking at the actual content and goals, 
the dimensions of employment, social affairs and 
the harmonisation of criminal law are also very 
strongly present. What are the implications of its 
multi-dimensional nature? 
2.2 The legal context 
The measure has its legal basis in Art. 63.3.b of 
Title IV of the EC Treaty (Visas, Asylum, 
Immigration and Other Policies Related to the Free 
Movement of Persons), which contains measures 
aimed at tackling the phenomenon of irregular 
immigration.
20 While the paramount goal is “taking 
action against illegal immigration”, the principal 
focus is employment and working conditions. One 
must ask, therefore, whether the current legal basis 
really is the most appropriate one. 
The strong links of the proposal with the wider area 
of employment are evident from the content, i.e. 
irregular employment or undeclared work, as well as 
the target group, i.e. the employers. The employers 
are the main subject of the obligations and system of 
sanctions.
21 This includes any legal or natural 
person, but also private individuals for and under 
the direction of whom a TCN carries out 
employment activities.
22 Further, the proposal 
claims it will contribute to the reduction of labour 
exploitation, which is clearly an employment issue. 
In light of this, the actual effects that the legislative 
measure could have in the area of irregular 
immigration would be only a by-product of the  
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wider fields of action covered by the act. Therefore, 
the initiative more correctly falls within the context 
of employment and social affairs (Title VIII of the 
EC Treaty on Employment), instead of immigration. 
Further, one of the core objectives of the proposal is 
to achieve a minimum level of harmonisation at 
European level that would establish a prohibition on 
the employment of TCNs irregularly present in the 
territory of a member state through the application 
of a series of administrative measures, financial 
sanctions and criminal penalties against the 
employer.
23 At first glance, one could think that the 
proposal should have been based on the EU Third 
Pillar, as this is the proper venue for the 
harmonisation of substantive criminal law.
24  
This view would disregard, however, the proactive 
role that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
played in widening EC competence over this field 
beyond Title VI of the TEU.
25 In Case 176/03, 
Commission v. Council, Criminal Sanctions for the 
Protection of the Environment,
26 the ECJ recognised 
for the first time that the European Community has 
the competence to act in criminal matters when they 
are related to a specific Community policy, and on 
the condition that they are essential to ensure full 
effectiveness for enforcing EC law and to combat 
serious shortcomings in the implementation of the 
Community’s objectives.
27 The fact that Case 
176/03 is related to environmental law does not in 
principle prevent other EC policies from benefiting 
from the liberalisation.
28  
After looking at the weaknesses related to its 
rationale and scope, one aspect that still remains 
critical is the relationship with proportionality and 
effectiveness. The lawfulness and legitimacy of the 
exercise of Community competence in this area, and 
its EU added value, need to be carefully addressed 
from this perspective. 
3. Is there an added value to harmonising 
sanctions against employers? 
As a general rule, the European Community has 
competence to enact legislation only when the 
objectives of that action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the member states themselves, thereby 
passing the test of comparative efficiency.
29 In light 
of this requirement, the European Commission is 
obliged to justify the reasons why the action would 
be better achieved at European level in all those 
policies where it does not possess exclusive 
competence.
30 
The proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum argues 
that action at the national level would not be 
sufficient because there would be a risk of 
“significantly different levels of sanctions and 
enforcement in different Member States” which 
could “lead to distortions of competition within the 
single market and to secondary movements of 
illegally staying third-country nationals to Member 
States to lower levels of sanctions and 
enforcement”. In the view of the European 
Commission, a common minimum level of 
sanctions on employers would ensure that:  
1. All member states would have a sufficiently high 
level of sanctions to serve as deterrence;  
2. Sanctions would not be so different as to give rise 
to secondary movements of irregularly staying 
TCNs; and  
3. There would be a level playing field for 
businesses across the EU as every EU employer 
would be aware that their peers and competitors 
would be subject to the same minimum sanctions.  
Do these three official grounds justify Community 
action?  
3.1 Illegal employment as ‘pull factor’  
While the real long-term implications of applying 
criminal sanctions to employers to reduce irregular 
immigration are not easy to ascertain, using the pull 
factor argument as one of the main justification for 
founding a European policy is dubious. As the 
European Commission well knows, the picture is far 
more complicated. The general availability of labour 
and other rationales, such as the socio-economic 
inequalities, structural conditions and political 
scenarios in the countries of origin and destination, 
provide some illumination on cross-border human 
mobility. The argument of illegal employment as 
pull factor oversimplifies a phenomenon that is by 
its very nature complex and multifaceted.  
The person on the move is not active or passive in 
relation to simple pull or push factors driving her/his 
mobility and stay, and/or the degree of 
restrictiveness of the immigration policies about 
these elements in the receiving countries. Instead, 
human mobility follows a complex web of 
autonomous rationales and purposes, which are 
independent from any single determining factor. 
The EU’s internal experience with free movement of 
workers is the most obvious example of this. Even 
very substantial differences in unemployment rates, 
job opportunities and levels of social benefits from 
one member state to another do not result in a 
redistribution of workers in the EU that would 
satisfy any economist.  
3.2 The diversity of sanctions & 
ineffective enforcement mechanisms 
According to the information provided by the 
Impact Assessment of the proposal,
31 at least 26 of 
the 27 EU member states have employer sanctions  
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already in place (information on Cyprus was 
apparently not available). One of the arguments put 
forward by the European Commission to have a 
common framework is that current national 
enforcement mechanisms are in fact not effective in 
practice. However, the Commission has not shown 
how the proposal would be more successful in 
helping to remedy current enforcement difficulties.
32  
In addition, the argument that irregularly staying 
TCNs inside the EU seek out those juridical systems 
where employer sanctions are more lenient is 
particularly difficult to substantiate. If the sanctions 
would have any potential effect, in practice, this 
would rather be related to the sphere of employers 
and for instance, their decision to move and settle in 
another member state, to continue hiring TCNs 
under irregular status of stay, etc. 
3.3 The test of proportionality and 
effectiveness 
A Community policy could have disproportionate 
effects when taking into account the different laws, 
policies and practices in the context of employment 
in an EU of 27. Based on that diversity, the 
application of a higher number of punitive measures 
and administrative burdens (sphere of  control), as 
well as of criminal sanctions (sphere of penalties) 
could also raise a number of issues when making 
them subject to the proportionality and effectiveness 
tests. 
As regards the sphere of control, the proposal will 
increase the administrative burdens on both the state 
and the employer. For instance, the Directive calls 
for inspections of employee records in 10% of a 
member state’s work establishments, whereas, 
according to the European Commission’s Impact 
Assessment, only 2% of the establishments in the 
member state are subject to such inspections. 
Compliance therefore would require a substantial 
increase in financial and personnel resources by the 
member states. Furthermore, the initiative does not 
establish any criteria or mechanisms for controlling 
the quality of the required inspections, which may 
reduce their effectiveness. 
Inspections will be based on risk assessments. In our 
view, these should not constitute the sole ground 
upon which an inspection would take place. The 
inspection mechanism based on risk analysis must 
not bring about the objectionable practice of 
business ‘profiling’. Such a practice would be 
discriminatory in nature, with the result that some 
labour sectors and employers would be subject to 
greater checks than others because of their ‘risky 
features’. This could be the case, for instance, for 
small- and medium-sized enterprises as they 
contribute significantly in the generation of 
employment, and of ethnic minority business. 
Employers will be transformed into ‘watchdogs of 
the EU’ regarding irregular immigration. They will 
be forced to play the role of controller of access to 
employment by TCNs. At the same time, employers 
will be subject to more administrative and 
bureaucratic burdens without receiving any help 
from the EU on how to fulfil their obligations. 
Also on grounds of proportionality, why do only 
irregularly staying TCNs have the right to recover 
back payments? Should not EU nationals also enjoy 
these rights against unscrupulous employers? This 
could lead to discrimination in relation to all other 
workers not falling within this narrow legal category 
and personal scope.  
Concerning the sphere of penalties, in case of non-
compliance, the employer may face criminal 
sanctions. The use of criminal law may actually 
have counterproductive effects in the dimension of 
employment and working conditions. By 
establishing a tighter penal framework, the proposal 
could undermine the achievement of its own 
objectives in terms of creating jobs, guaranteeing 
employment security, preventing exploitation and 
increasing labour opportunities in the EU. In fact, 
employers may be potentially encouraged to stop 
hiring TCNs for fear of being sanctioned. The 
European policy could in this way lead to penalising 
all employment of TCN workers. Therefore, the 
measure could be manifestly inappropriate with 
regard to the objective it seeks to pursue. 
In light of the above, is there not a simpler, more 
effective and balanced way, other than sanctions and 
punitive measures, to achieve the goals being 
pursued by the proposal? We argue here that their 
application might even lead to more instability and 
insecurity for the employer and the TCN worker.  
One of the general objectives of the proposal is to 
reduce exploitation of irregularly staying TCN. 
However, the European Commission has not taken 
into account that the phenomenon of irregular 
immigration and the disadvantageous working 
conditions that some TCN workers face are linked 
with the rigidity of national immigration legislation. 
This restrictiveness is too often mismatched with the 
socio-economic realities and labour market needs of 
the member states. In this regard, and as the 
European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions has rightly pointed 
out in one of its latest studies, “it could be important 
to adjust the rules on entry and work permits to the 
actual conditions of labour demand”.
33 
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The Community approach should instead focus on 
establishing quick, easy and facilitated procedures 
by which an employer who wishes to hire a TCN in 
need of a work permit can obtain one, or where an 
employer who has already employed a TCN can 
procure the necessary work authorisation. The 
necessary administrative documents need to be 
issued rapidly and without disrupting business, 
wherever the business case is made. Helping 
employers to do business and meet their needs 
would be a more effective and proportionate 
approach to promote economic development and 
growth in the EU. 
3.4 The package of guarantees  
The most effective way to prevent penalising the 
TCN worker when implementing any legislative 
framework on sanctions on employers is to put into 
practice an effective, transparent, open and flexible 
procedure for the presentation of complaints, and to 
take duly into account the human rights context.
34 
The worker needs to be protected during the whole 
complaint process in order to guarantee that s/he 
does not suffer a higher level of insecurity of work 
and residence. It is also necessary that the persons 
who would be allowed to lodge a complaint would 
not only include the TCN under irregular 
employment conditions, but also other designated 
third parties who may provide assistance.
35  
As the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC), the Platform for International Cooperation 
on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) and  the 
NGO Solidar have emphasised in their Joint 
Comments applicable to the Commission’s 
proposal,
36 the establishment of effective complaint 
mechanisms to be used by the TCNs against the 
employer would be the only viable way to ensure 
that the system provided by the proposed Directive 
would be effective. It is fundamental that the 
member states implement a parallel system of 
protection for those workers who have lodged a 
complaint against their employer until the final 
decision by the competent authorities is reached.  
Therefore, the minimum set of guarantees put 
forward by the European Commission’s initiative 
are welcome and positive in nature, yet their value 
added remains unclear to the already existing 
guarantees in the national arena. On the other hand, 
the negotiations of the proposal inside the Council 
should not lead to the establishment of a common 
framework of criminalisation of employers having 
undesired implications for the employability of 
TCNs and their protection against cases of 
exploitation. The minimum set of guarantees for the 
TCN workers as provided by the proposal needs to 
constitute the sine qua non for the initiative to 
succeed. 
3.5 A level playing field for employment 
The creation of a level playing field for employment 
would very much depend on the way in which the 
Directive would be implemented and enforced in the 
national arena. Leaving too much discretion to the 
member states in operationalising the harmonised 
“minimum standards on prevention and 
criminalisation” could undermine the achievement 
of a ‘common level playing field’ for business all 
across the EU. This goes along with the lack of 
evidence on the way in which the proposal would 
constitute a remedy to current enforcement 
difficulties and inefficiencies in the national arena. 
3.6 The role of the national parliaments in 
the proportionality and subsidiarity check  
The mandate for a Reform Treaty agreed by the 
Council in the Brussels Presidency Conclusions of 
21-22 June 2007 has, among other major 
innovations, enhanced the role of national 
parliaments in evaluating the implementation of EU 
policies, including those related to immigration. In 
particular, the mandate gives them a stronger 
position in relation to the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality. There will be a “reinforced 
control mechanism of subsidiarity” so that “if a 
draft legislative act is contested by a simple 
majority of the votes allocated to national 
parliaments, the Commission will re-examine the 
draft act, which it may decide to maintain, amend or 
withdraw”.  
In fact, when the Reform Treaty enters into force, 
critical opinions such as the one expressed by the 
Bundesrat in Germany about the proposal and its 
incompatibility with the principles of 
proportionality and subsidiarity,
37 will find a proper 
venue for consideration and debate. This proposal 
may in fact be one of the first legislative acts to test 
this mechanism. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper has reviewed the scope, features and 
added value of the proposal for a Directive 
providing for sanctions against employers of 
illegally staying third country nationals 2007(249). 
We have first argued that the scope of the initiative 
raises a series of vulnerabilities. The definition of 
illegal employment on the sole basis of the irregular 
nature of stay consolidates a sectoral and partial 
Community approach which would only cover 
certain categories of TCN workers. This will result 
in discrimination. Furthermore, the proposal’s link 
with the area of employment and working 
conditions are evident when looking at the content 
and aims, as well as the target group, namely 
employers. The impact on undeclared work and  
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labour exploitation is entirely unknown and 
inadequately argued.  
In light of these deficiencies, the limited personal 
scope and the employment relevance have 
fundamental implications for the legal basis as well 
as the general framing of the act as a purely 
immigration-control measure.  
On whether there is an EU added value, the official 
justification provided by the European Commission 
does not seem to constitute a sustainable or solid 
ground upon which to construct a common policy. 
The compatibility of the proposal with the principles 
of proportionality and effectiveness is open to 
debate. By mainly focusing on penalising employers 
and criminalising employment, and on giving 
priority to immigration control, the value added of 
having a Community framework may be 
undermined.  
Finally, a common immigration policy should not 
focus its action and efforts on applying a stricter 
criminal framework fostering the criminalisation of 
the recruitment of people. Instead, the Community 
approach should address generally the issue of 
undeclared work from an employment and social 
affairs-related perspective. The prevention of 
exploitation of the TCN workers and the 
improvement of working conditions are important 
objectives to be pursued, but employers and 
employees must first be provided with a clear, 
efficient, swift and transparent labour and residence 
permit(s) system. Only after such a common EU 
system is in place might it be appropriate to apply 
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